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Euthanasia and B iathanasia:
On Dying and Killing
David W . Louisell

me.
the story was a lady li ving
ally
who had been d ivorced an d
no
died a t the age o f 8 2, lea'
oke
known s urvivo rs. She o ft en
of.
o f her dire need for, but I<
huma n companio ns hip. The ·nse
be
o f her unha ppiness can ai m
to uc hed fro m he r own wo
mly
·' It's suc h a grim life; th
ll ntil
thing yo u can do is to bear
som eone shoots you." Her hysician te lls her, " Yo u do no t now
wha t is o n the o ther s ide'" a1 she
answers "Wha t I know is l this
side a nd l don't wa nt a ny n ··e of
it." That she remains ratim• and
Proj"essor Louise//. a membe r o/ indeed intellectua l even aft she
th e Lin acre £di10ria/ ad 1•iso ty broke he r hip and was i mm~ ·l ized
board. is the Elizabeth Josselyn - po inting o ut for exam pl that
B oalt Professor of Law at th e Uni- she kn o ws she is lucky co1 Mecl
versity of California La w School in to the aged poverty-strid n of
Be rke ley. His article was original~'' India - seems o nly to exat rbate
delivere d as the . 1972 Pope John the tragedy by emphasizir the
XX JJJ lecture at the Cath o lic Uni- fe lt pain .
At the beginning the an nl IJ ncer
versitv ol America. Ai his request.
had
sa id: ··Because of th e set ~ i tive
we p~tbii:sh this article as delivered
with all of the nuances arising out na ture o f this program (the sp· nsor)
of the delicate ethical distinctions has re linqu ishe d a ll com n,c:rcial
messages." But its generous imdrawn.

Introduction: The Nature
of the Dilemma
Not long ago o ne of the country"s
great fina nc ial ho uses sponsnred a
te levision show calle d ··T he Very
Personal Death o f E lizabe th Schell
Ho lt-Ha rtford." It starkly dramatized o ne of the sadd est phases o f
th e human condition , perhaps especially cruel q ua ntitatively a nd
quali tatively in o ur ge ne rati o n: the
lo neliness, sense of uselessness and
aba ndo nme nt, and bitte rness o f
many o ld people. The subjec t of
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pulses had little counte rpa rt in
the public~s reaction , wh ic h evidenced a bitterness not unli ke tha t
of Mrs. H olt-Hartford's own dec lining years. In a wo rd, the sponsor
was c harged with advocating euthanasia. The reactio ns ranged fro m
the frenetic to the thoug htful, one
writer po in ting o ut that what was
reprehensible about the program
was (according to his in terpretation) that the o nly solu tio n to the
problem of old age that was suggested was euthanas ia. One who
did no t view the prog ram will withhold appraisal of the accuracy of
this essentially artistic judgment
of .the theme. The interesting thing
for o ur purposes w~s the universal
use of the wo rd "eutha nasia " to
characterize that theme. Y o u have
advocated e utha nasia , and euthanasia is murder!

apparently it was amo ng the reactors to "The Very P e rso nal Death
o f Elizabeth Schell Holt-Hartford .''
It has come to mea n the deliberate.
intended putting to death painlessly of o ne human perso n by another,
the willed terminatio n of human
life, whic h is a eu phemism fo r murder as defined by our law. It would
have been better to ad here to the
o riginal meaning o f "euthanasia"
a nd use ano ther wo rd, pe rhaps "biatha nasia" fo r delibe rate, affi rmative killing in the mercy-death contex t. But so pervasive and un iversal
is the te rmin o logical corruption
that scholars, too, seem to have relinquished any notion of restor ing
o riginal usage and have accepted
the m ode rn meaning o f euthanasia.
T hus Professor Arthur J. Dyck, in
us ing "eutha nasia" in the modern
sense, would adopt as a synonym
for its origi na l meaning the Lati n
Had I been privy to the reactions expression, benemortasia. 2
to "The Very Personal Death of
Elizabeth Schell Ho lt-Hartford"
The Definitional Problem:
when the facl.\lty invited me to deVoluntary and Involuntary
live r the Po pe John XXIII lecture
Euthanasia
this year, I wonder whethe r 1 wo uld
have had the fortitude to persevere
Taking "eutha nasia", in accorwith a title using " Eutha nasia." dan ce with modern usage, to mean
Yet, in its precise mea ning. '"eu- deli berate , intentio nal
painless
thaneasia" is the desideratum of killing is only the beginning of the
religion as well as o f any m o rally definitiona l problem. Do we mean
or ethically based socia l policy that to include such a killing o nly when
has to do with death. Coming from it is sought and requested by the
the Greek wo rds meaning "good" eutha natee, o r also o ne imposed
and "death", it specifies the kind upon him without regard to his
of a death that must be as m uc h consent - the e liminatio n of defecthe ideal o f the mora l theologia n tive o r ho pelessly ill or senile peras it is of the philosopher a nd sons, fo r example, H itler's "useless
secular humanist - a happy death. eaters"? In a word, d o we mean o nly
Yet its corruption seems as perva- volu ntary, o r a lso involuntary, eusive in popular usage generally as thanasia?
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On the surface, the dichotomy
would appear clean-cut. If so, the
precise thinker would have cause
to resent the countering of argume nt for o r against voluntary euthanasia, with argument pertinent only
to the involuntary kind. For example, during the debate on the 1936
bill in Parliament for voluntary
e uthanasia, one of the promine nt
pro ponents invoked two dramatic
and appealing cases, one where a
man had drowned his four year old
daug hter who had contracted tube rc ulosis and had develobed gangre ne
on the face, the other where a wo man had killed her mother who was
suffe ring from general paralysis
of the insane. Obviously these were
instances of compulsory. o r in voluntary, e uthanasia, yet, alt hough
the propo nent acknowledged that
the cases were not covered by the
proposed bill for voluntary e uthanasia, they were the o nly specific
cases he described.a
Digging a bit below the surface
of the voluntary-involuntary dic hotomy may re nde r the purist
more unde rstanding of the ·rea sons
for the c onfusion a nd more to le r·
ant of the confused. A page of history may again be worth a c hapter
o f linguis tic analysis.
Among some primitive people
the abandonme nt or killing of the
aged or helpless apparently was an
accepted practice. The Hotte ntots
carried the ir e lderly pare nts into
the bush to die. The Lapp who became too infirm to trek over the
mo unta ins with their families were
left behind to die unattended, the ir
frozen corpses to be buried o n
the family's return. But it is easy
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to overly generalize about cw
of euthanasia among primitive
many societies have actuall y
shown to have had elaborate l
protective of their senio r men

ms
'or
en
les
rs.

"Instances of this are seen in ho
tality custo ms, property rights, r,
taboos reserving certain cho ice dis
fo r the aged (ostensibly as harn·
to the young) and o ther usages. "4

Doubtless the settled agricul ·al
communities showed the ~ est
level of solic itude for the el ; ly,
as witness the laws of the He : :ws
in the Old Testament for bi ing
the killing of the innocent an' LJ St.
In classical Greece there do L not
seem to have been aba ndonm· t of
elderly or h elpless adults. O f <. trse
in ancient Ro me, largely undt the
influence of the Stoics, suicid was
a n accepted form of death as
escape from disgrace at the hat ·, of
an e nemy, as indeed it wa1. ntil
recently at least in Japan und. the
form o f hara-kiri. Yet Cicero .vho
had written: "The God that ules
within us forbids us to depart i. ·nee
unbidde n" abided his com • tion
a nd declin ed to play the· "R man
fool" when pursue d to d eath l • 1he
re ve nge of Antony.5 Jewish , ( hristian and Is lam ic teachings ,dik e
have always maintained th a deliberate killing in case o f abn ~> mality or inc ura ble illness is wrong T he
appare nt exceptio n in St. T h lmas
Moore's Utopia is often ove r read
to imply his personal e ndorsemcnt. 6
The modern inte rest in eu thanasia is usually date d from the I ~70's
but the formal movement d id not
begin in Britain until the 1930.!-> with
the organization in 1935 or the
g roup now known as the Voluntary
Euthanasia Society. The fi rst bill
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on euthanasia was bro ught befo re
The Eutha n.asia Society of Ame rittie United Kingdom Pa rlia ment in ca was cons tituted in 1938 and a
1936. It required for e ligibility fo r bill, following the 1936 British modeuthanasia that the patie nt be over el, was introduced that year in the
twenty-one yea rs of age, be suffe r- Nebraska Assembly but lost. A simiing from an inc urable and fa tal ill- lar a ttemp t fa iled in the Ne w Yo rk
ness, and sign a form in the pre- Assembly. 12 "The Euthanasia Sosence of two witnesses asking to be c ie ty of America had at first proput to death. It embraced rela ti vely posed to advocate the compulsory
complicated legal proceedings in- 'euthanasia' o f monstrosities a nd
cluding investigation by a e uthana- imbeciles, but as a result of replies
sia referee and a hearing before a to a questionnaire add ressed to
special court. In 1950 the re was physicians in the State of New York
further debate in the House o f in 1941, it decided to limit itself
Lords on a motion in favo r o f vol- to propaganda for vol unta ry e uthauntary euthanasia.7
nasia."13 To what extent the purThe distinguis hed legal scholar po rted restriction of recent euand specialist in criminal law, Pro- thanasia efforts to the voluntary
fessor Glan ville Willia ms, realizing kind , is a fun ction of the e uthanathe practical necessity of coun ter- s ia o f Nazi Germany and revelaing the contention that too muc h tions of the Nurembe rg trials , is
formality in the sick room would a ma tter for speculation.t4 In any
destroy the doc tor-pati e nt relation,s event, there is today no country in
in his classic The Sanctity of Life the wo rld whose law permits euand the Criminal La w9 proposed a thanasia ei ther of the voluntary or
simple formula quite diffe rent from involuntary type. French and Swiss
the 1936 attempt. He suggested the permissiveness whereby a physiuncomplicated provisio n that no c ian may provide, but may not admedical practitioner sho uld be guil- minister, poison at the request of
ty of an offense in res pect o f a n a dying patient, is to be distinact done intentio nally to accelerate guis hed.15
the death o f a patie nt who is seriously ill, unless it is proved that the
Some Difficulties
act was not do ne in good faith and
In vie w of the fac ial restric tion
for the purpose o f saving him from of the current euthanasia movesevere pain in a n illness believed to me nt to the voluntary type, why in
be of an incurable and fatal c harac- the argument over it does confuter. to This was the basis o f the 1968 sio n persist as to what precisely is
· draft bill which, with c hanges, was being proposed. Why has Glanville
debated in the Lo rds in 1969. The Williams protested:
most recent parlimentary euthanaT he !English Society's! bill Jdehated
sia debate was in the Ho use of Comin ·Lords in 1936 and 19501 excluded
mons in April, 1970, on a motion
any question of compulsory euthafor leave to introduce a bill.ll No
nasia. even fo r hopelessly defective
statute has been e nacted.
infants. Unfortunately , a legislali ve
November, 1973
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proposa l is not assured of success
merely because it is worded in a stu·
diously moderate and restrictive form.
The method of attack, by those who
dislike the proposal, is to use the '"thin
edge of the wedge" argument ...
There is no proposal for reform of
any topic, however conciliatory and
moderate, that cannot be opposed by
this dialectic. 16

Criminal Law, was: "The use at
may be made of my proposed r ·asure (euthanasia) in respect of mtients who a re mino rs is best ·ft
to the good sense of the doctor. k·
ing into accou nt, as he always d -!S.
the wishes of the parents as ..:11
as those of the child." 17 Those s ·pLical about the vagaries and n m·
At least several observations a re losity of judicial "discretion" •ill
pe rtinent in ex pla nation of the pe r- take note!l8
sisting terminological confusion.
Secondly, by definition vc un·
Some perhaps pertain only to subtary
euthanasia would be avai ble
jective appraisal of the good faith
only
to those who freely, ir• ·IIio f discussants, but others seem to
gently
and knowingly reque) it.
proceed from the reality that, inT
his
presupposes
n1ental co petrinsically, voluntary euthanasia is
te
nce.
Might
the
test-of
compe l 1ce
not as severable from the involunbe
as
inta
ngible
and
uncertai
as,
tary as the clean-cut verbal distincin
a
given
case,
it
may
be
in
re
.ect
tion suggests.
First, the problem of the rights of execution of a will ; or co• ni t·
of minors always lurks to compound ment as potentially dangerou or
responsibility for criminal COi luct
t he difficulti es of human forays in- whether under the M'Nagh n, 19
to life-death decisions unless appliDurham,2° Mode l Penal C. le,21
cation to mi"nors is explicitly pre22
cluded. Normally decisions respect- or d iminished res ponsibility 1 -;t;
or capacity to stand trial.23 T l : de·
ing serious medical procedures on
termination of competence •ight
mino rs must await parental or guarbe in a context even more mer·
dian approval, altho ug h historically
ge nt and difficult than that hich
there have been exceptions for
exists fo r conventional deter n ina·
emergencies and now further extions, a nd the significance of ~rror
ceptions under the impetus of pereven more dire, that is, irreve sible.
missive abortion laws. If euthanasia
Moreover difficulties migh t and
is right, should it be withheld from
perhaps typically would be. com·
a n intelligent and knowledgeable
po unded by the inhibition o free
minor, say one of a n age whose
choice inherent in subjection to
judgment would be highly pertinent
pain-killing drugs.24
to judicial decision respecting child
custody in divorce-cases? And if the
Thirdly, quite independe ntly of
minor and parent differ.on accelera- the effect of narcotics on con·
tion of the former's death, whose sciousness, pain itself, the toxic
judgment controls? Confronted effects of disease, a nd the re per·
with this dilemna, a ppare ntly the cussions o f surgical procedures may
best that Glanville Williams could substantially undermine the capac·
do in The Sanctity of Life and the ity for rationa l and independent
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. thought. As Professor Yale Kamisar
asks: " If .. . a man in this plight
(throes of serious pain o r disease)
were a c riminal defendant and he
were to decline the assistance of
counsel would the courts hold that
he had 'intelligently and understandingly waived the benefit of
counsel'?''25 Would a confession
made in such circumstances be
admissible?

Fo urthly, what of the proposed
euthanatee who is unable to communicate for himself, for example
the vic tim of lasting coma? W o uld
another, possibly a spouse o r next
of kin, be presumed to be a competent speaker for him ? Those who
have inquired into the a u thority of
one to bear for another the decisio nal burden in the more conventional medical dilemmas (such
for example where the doctrine of
informed consent may req uire that
information about a dangerous procedure be given the pat ie nt which
he is psychologically unable to
bear, and the physician instead
speaks with the spouse) know how
diffic ul t it is to construct a n adequate juridical basis fo r placement of the patient's b urden of
decision on another. even a loving
spouse.26 After all, an adult under
no legal disability has no natural
guardian. The 1969 British bill per. haps avoids this dilemna at least in
part by p roviding that a declaration fo r euthanasia shall come into
force 30 days after being made,
shall re main in force, unless revoked, for three years , a nd a declaratio n re-executed within the 12
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months preceding its expiry date
shall remain ·in force , unless revoked, during the lifetime of the
declarant.27 Even so, the problem
of the continuing effectiveness of
a declaration , during for example
the declarant's long coma with for
instance a spouse claiming its revocation might raise - but in an
even more psychologically traumatic context - the afore-suggested
impo nderables of a life-death dec ision made by one for another.
Lastly, Glanville Williams' resentment of the "thin edge of the
wedge" opposition to e uthanasia,
however justified in the abstract,
loses cogency in the actual context
of the movement's strategy and tactics. I submit that Yale Kamisar
has convincingly demonstrated that
the m ovement's purpose and method su bstantially has been utilization
of the " wedge" princ iple.28 My conviction in this regard has been fortified by my persona l o bservations
of how effectively the "wedge" princ iple h as been used in the movement to permissive abortion . I have
heard the public protests of the
proponents "All we want is th is
moderate statute" (as they characterized the California one, permitti ng abortion when the mother's
physical or mental heal th is threat·
ened and in case of felo nious sexual assault)29 "give us this a nd we
will ask no more." B ut I heard them
simultaneously boasting privately:
"Just wait till the door is o pened.
and our foot is in it !" The boast
was not an idle one. A physician
has drawn a meaningful parallel:
" I don 't think that human con-
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scio usness and psychology as it
exists in our society today could
tolerate euthanasia. Yet 20 years
ago our society wouldn' t have tolerated extensive abortion . Our
mo res c hange."30
The " thin edge o f the wedge"
danger is real; the camel's nose does
get under the tent; o nce opened,
the movement of the door to death
by huma n choice may be a consta ntly widening, and likely a
never na rrowing, movement. It
seems pe rtinent to remember that
the Hitlerian eugenic euthanasia,
the e limination of " useless eaters,"
whic h preceded his wholesale racial
genocide, was supported by "humanitarian" petitio ns to him by
parents o f malformed children requesting authority for "mercy
deaths." It is perhaps the supreme
irony that at first Jews were apparently excluded from the program
on the ground that they did not
deserve the benefit of psychiatric
e u thanasia! 31
Is the distinction between volun·
tary and involuntary euthanasia as
meaningful and abiding as its facile
verbal formulation would suggest?
But let us take the proponents at
their present word, a nd limit out
discussion chiefly to so-called "vol·
untary" e uthanasia.32 And let us
wo rk with a definition of voluntary
euth a nasia that puts the affirmative
case in the strongest possible terms,
as I believe Professo r Kamisar's
defi nitio n does in ·assuming:
A person ... in fact ( I ) presently in·
curable, (2) beyond the aid of any
respite which may come alo ng in his
life expectancy, suffering (3) intolerable and (4) unmitigatable pai n
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and of a (5) fixed and (6) ratio•
desire to die .. _33

But before applying that d efi r on
to o ur problem, a few mo re re·
liminary delineations a re in 1 fe r.
More Definitional Proble n
(i) Euthanasia v. Extraordin y
Means to Preserve Life :.
( ii) Euthanasia v. Alleviati
of Pain by Drugs

In the word "euthanasia"
do
not include - a nd I subm it hat
o ne who struggles for prec ise >mmunication should not inclut
the withholding of . extraon' ary
means to preserve life . To cal the
mere withholding of extraord ..try
means " indirect voluntary e thanasia" is I submit, taking int ac·
count the currently accepted r an·
ing o f "euthanasia" as deli b ate
killing , a confusion of term~ hat
cannot conduce to precisi<' of
thought.34 Putting aside for the
moment the difficulties in ade" ately a rticulating the differenc, between "extraordinary" :md · 1rdi·
nary" means of preserving lift- the
soundness of the distinction in ;)rinciple becomes a part of my nain
thesis today. If the distinctio; between affirmative killing a nd IL!ting
die is only a quibble, as some have
characterized it,35 my thesis ails.
The student of this problem. especially one innured to commonlaw thinking, must be careful lest
he assimilate the "extraordinary"
- "ordinary" means distinction to
o ur law's classic d ifferentiation between "action" and "inaction". The
common law's notion that despite
the relative ease of rescue a strang-
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er may safely ignore a person in
· dire predicament - a d rowning
child, fo r . example - whereas if
he acts St. Luke's Good Samaritan
role and undertakes· rescue he is
held to the standard of due care,36
does not govern in the typical application of the "extraordinary" "ordinary" means distinction. Under the common law rule (which by
no means is universally accepted)37
a physicia n may refuse aid to the
stranger-victim of an emergency
without incurring legal liabili ty,
however morally reprehe nsible his
abstenance may be , while in voluntarily rendering aid he inc urs the
obligation of using due care.38 The
way this caused Good Samaritan
statutes, exculpating the physic ian
who follows his conscience rather
than his convenience, to sweep the
country like prairie fire, is a story
I have tried to tell elsewhere39 a nd
need not detai n us here.
The important point for present
purposes is that the attending phy·
sician is of course not a volunteer ;
he is bound to the standards of
medical p erformance, including affirma tive acts, under the sanction
of malpractice liability, besides other sanctions. Thus an attending
physician's attempted justificatio n
for failure to fulfill the standards
of medical practice, on the sole
ground that his failure was "inaction" rather than "affirmative action" would be prepostero us.40 But
I shall attempt to show that a failure to use "extraord inary" or "hero·
ic" means is a different matter a nd ,
in a given context, may be both
legally and morally justifiable, or,
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indeed, perhaps even morally ob·
ligatory.
Similarly, I m aintain that the use
of drugs to alleviate pain, even
though that use in fact may hasten
death, is not "euthanasia" in the
modern meaning of direct, deliberate killing, because even if in both
cases death may be "willed" in
the sense of desired, there is a difference in means of abiding significance in the realities of the
huma n condition. Thus I think a
provision in the British euthanasia
bill of 1969 works a disservice to
clarity of analysis when it couples
a provision authorizing true euthanasia with one declaring that a pa·
tient suffering from an irremediable
condition reasonably thought in
his case to be terminal shall be
entitled to the administration of
whatever quantity of drugs may be
required to keep him free from
pain .41 I submit there is no serious
practical question of the present
legality of such use of drugs42 nor
a ny genuine problem with its ethi·
cality. 43 Daniel Maguire's recent
questio n equating " positive action"
and "calculated benign neglect" has
a simila r defect, although in his
instance there is at least the justi·
fica tion of a n ensuing explicit con·
fro ntation with the question's innue ndo .44
Whether my conclusion that it
is ethical for the physician to ad·
minister drugs to alleviate pain even
to a n extent that may shorten life
is any more viable than the prin·
ciple of double effect, . or whether
indeed that principle is enough to
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sustain the distinction, let us put
aside for the moment. But I sho uld
candidly note here that I am no t
a m o ng those inclined to emphas ize
th e moral value of pain . Sometimes
the writers, particularly some of
the more ancient theologians, seem
a lmost to be arguing that it is, after
a ll, human suffering tha t makes
this the best of all possible worlds!
Amidst such moc k heroics it is refreshing to turn to the common
sense of Pius XII who in his Fe bruary , 1957 address to the Italian anesthesio logists, after pointing o ut
that the growth in the love of God
does not come from suffe ring itself
but from the intention of the will,
candidly concluded that instead o f
assisting toward expiation a nd
m erit, s uffe ring can a lso fu rnish
occasio n for new faults.45 Surely
there must be a midground between
the exaltatio n of human suffering
as glorious, and the attitude ofte~
lived by today that it is the ultim ate e vil , re flected in the automatic g ulp fro m the aspirin bo ttle at
th e mere hint o f a headache.

The Ethics of
Voluntary Euthanasia
H ad this paper been presented
fiftee n years ago, its gist almost
necessarily would have been a n inquiry into the ethics o f euthanasia.
But in the meantime such inquiry.
acutely e ngendered a t o ne stage by
the running debate . between G Ianville Williams46 and his o pponent s.
has been richly productive. My
viewpoint - that whatever the diminutio n o f mo ral re pre hensibility
by the fac ts of a give n case,_ euthanasia in principle is une th1cal as
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we ll as illegal killing - has air,
been essentially presented by
law pro fessor colleagues Yale
misar,47 Charles E. Rice, 48 and
vid Daube,49 and by Norman
Jo hn Stevas. M.P ..50 and othL
T he re fore. I tarry o nly brie fl y
the ethi cs of voluntary e utha n
itself. that is, th e deliberate, affi 1
tive, intentional act of effecti1
m ercy death.

ty
y
I·

l.
>I

h

a
a.,
a

My o nly seri ous issue with ' t )fessor Kamisar concerns his t v .
"Some No n-R e ligio us Views Ag: s l
Proposed 'M e rcy-Killing' Le1. alio n". Supporting the distinc t n,
he says: " I leave the religious _a ume nts (fo r opposing euthanasia o
the theologia ns."52 True, the inj ction o f Exodusf>3 "The innocent •d
just m a n thou s halt not pur o
death'' a rguably is a re ligious . 1r
perhaps more precisely, a theo i ~~
cal reason, fo r opposing e uthan <· ,..
He who is Lo rd of Life is also ·imately Lo rd of the time o f De h.
But e xcept as Scripture or e " apotations therefrom, or from eceived C hristian traditio n ,· fo n ulate religious reasons for oppo' 1g
e uthanasia, in what way do the · elig io us" reasons differ from 1e
" no n-re ligious" or utilita rian on· <>?
A warning comes to mind :
It is a great mistake to let poepl,
know that moral issues involve religio n . If you talk about religion yo •
migh t just as well talk about po litic'
Everyone agrees that politics and r..:
ligion are a matter of op ini o~o. Yo u
can take your pick ...
Let this be clear. When we talk
abo ut moral problems we are not
talking about religious beliefs - w~i ch
we can take or leave. Stealing, lymg.

Linacre Quarterly

killing , forni cating would be wrong
even if no church C{)ndemned them.
H ijacking aircraft , tossing bombs into
crowded shoppi ng centers and selling
drugs to your c hildren ·are no t sins
mentioned in the bible. Nor is euthanasia. So keep religion u ut of this .. _:;.~

I perhaps belie the wisdom implicit
in the foregoing when I reveal that
the writer is the Archbishop of
Westminis ter, Jo hn Cardinal Heenan.
Are not the fo llowing reasons for
opposing voluntary eu than asia
both "re li g io us" and " n o n -re ligious"? Ascertainment of a sick
person's abiding desire for death
and persistent a nd true intention
affirmatively to seek it, is intrinsically diffic ult and o ften impossible. The difficulties inhere in illness with its pain and distraction ,
and are compounded by narcotics
and analgesics. Anything like the
legal standard for voluntariness in
other con texts, for example for
criminal confessions, wo uld be hard
to achieve. W o uld minors of knowledgeable age and discretion be allowed to elect it, and with or without parental consent? A decisio n
made befor e illness to elect e uthanasia conditio nally. would ha ve
morbid aspects a nd wou ld leave
lingering do ubts as to the cont inuity
of inte ntio n , especially with intervening coma. Euthanasia, if legall y
formalized by procedural restrictions, would threaten to conve rt
the sick room into a n adjudicative
tribuna l. The conseque nces of required decisio ns a nd procedures
might be harshe r for the fam il y.
especially young children, than fo r
the dying pe rson. If left essentially to the discre tio n of the physi-
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cian, adm inistration of e utha nasia
would be as variable as the tremendous variatio n in medical competence. But not even the best physician is infallible and mistakes, necessarily irretrievable, would have
the odious flavor of avoidable tragedy. Moreover, the history of scie nce and medicine increasingly
demonstrates that yesterday's in curable disease is s ubject matter of
today's ro utine treatment. Even " inc urable" cancer is sometimes s ubject to remissions. 55 In medicine,
as in life itself, there is no true
hopelessness.
Euthanasia would threaten the
patient-physician relationship; confide nce might give way to sus picion.
Would a patient who had inte nded
to revoke his declaration for euthanas ia have faith that his second
word would be heeded? Can the
physician , historic battler for life,
become an affirmative agent of
death without jeopardizing the trust
of his dependents? Indeed, would
not his new functio n of active e utha nato r tend psychologically to
underm ine the physician's acclimati o n to the historic mandate, " I
place before you life a nd death.
Therefore, c hoose li fe. "?56 And
what would accepta nce of the psychology o f e uthanasia do to the
peace of mind of the mass of the
so-called incurables.
Lastly, how lo ng wo uld we have
voluntary e utha nas ia without s urrendering to pressures for the involuntary? Wo uld no t the pressures
be .t ruly ine xorable? Merely to ask
suc h questions and state these
points seems to belie a dichotomy
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between " re ligious" and " nGm-religious" reasons for opposing voluntary e uthanasia. I see essentially
huma n reasons.s7

There is no Obligation
"Officiously to Keep Alive"
the Dying
If humor may be brought to conside ratio n even of these grim pro ble ms - a nd perhaps the more serio us the problem, the more helpful
the light touch - I may be pardo ned for commencing this part
with the words of Arthur Hug h
C lo ugh who apparently wrote in
lig ht vein:
Though shalt not kill, but need'st
not strive Officiously to kee p alive .68

I submit that it is about as clear
as human answers can be in such
m atte rs that there is no moral obligation to keep alive by artificial
means the Elizabeth Schell HoltHa rtfords of the world whose lives
na ture would fo rfeit and who , in
na ture's terms, wish to die , o r in
C hristian terms, wish to pass over
to th e promised land. I . submit
further that the law in no manner
seeks to set at nought this mo ra l
truth . The moral idea was put this
way by Pius XII when in November
1957 he a nswered questions for the
Inte rnatio nal Congress of Anesthesiologists:
Natural reason and Christian mo r·
als say that man (and whoever is e ntrusted with the task o f taking care
o f his fellowman) has the right and
the duty in case of se rio us illness to
take the necessary treatment for the
preser vatio n o f life and health . T his
duty that one has toward himself.
toward God. toward the human community. and in most cases toward cer·
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tain determined persons. de rives fr
well ordered charity. fro m submis'•
to the Creator, from social justice .
even fro m strict justice, as well
fro m devotion toward o ne's fam ih
But normally one is he ld to
only o rd inary means - accordinl
ci rcumstances of persons, pia·
times, and culture - that is to
means that do not invo lve any gr
burden for oneself or another. A m·
strict obligation would be too bur
some fo r most men and would rer:
the attainment of the higher, m
important good too difficult. L
health, all temporal activities art
fact subordinated to spiritual er
O n the other hand, o ne is not for
den to take more than the stn .
necessary steps to preserve life
health, as long as he dOes not fa u
some more ser ious duty. 59

r
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A ltho ug h Pius XI£ did nol. believe, use the expression ·· .traordinary m eans" it has becomt -:usto mary to capture his thoug' in
the shorthand phrase " disti n tion
between o rdinary and extn , 1rd i·
nary means." It is a convenient ·ondensation but, as with short n. mes
generally , may mislead unless , larified . For one thing , there seer:·s to
be considerable difference be tv. een
the significance typically given the
"ordinary and extraordinary mta ns"
distinction by physicia ns on the
one hand , and moral theologwns,
on the other. Physicia ns seem to
take the distinction as equivalent to
that between c ustomary and unusual means as a matter o f medical
prac tice. Theologians pour in to the
distinctio n all factors relevant to
appropriate moral decision how·
ever non-medical they may be: the
patient's philosophic prefere nce,
the conditions of the fami ly including the economic facts, the
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relative hardships on a realistic
basis of one course · o f conduct as
contrasted with another.60 E ven
means that are "ordinary" from the
viewpoint of medical practice, may
be "extraordinary" in the to tality
of life's dilemmas.
Take the case of a three-year old
child, one of whose eyes had already been removed surgically because of malignant tumor. The
other eye later became infected in
the same way, and medical prognosis offered only the dilemma of
either certain death without further surgery or a considerable probability of saving the child's life by
a second ophthalmectomy. From
the medical viewpoint, doubtless
such surgery represents an o rdinary
means of saving life. I take it to be
the prevailing theological view that
(putting aside the additional problem of one acting for another the father for the three-year old)
one is no t obliged to save his life
when that entails a lifetime of total
blindness. In other words, under
the circums tances the surgery
would be an extraordinary, and
morally not required, way of saving Iife.st
Thus an artificial means, however ordinary in medical practice,
may be mora lly extraordinary and
not obligatory. Also, it may be
non-obligatory, even though o rdinary, beca use it is likely to be useless. (I speak now o f arllji'cial
means, such as surgery . and no t of
natural things as furnishing o f food .
drink a nd the means o f rest). To
save the convenient dis tinc ti o n between ordinary a nd extraordina ry
means, while at the same time pro-
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moting its accuracy, the theologians have wisely incorpo ra ted into
the defini tio ns qu a lificatio ns necessitated by such cases as the threeyear old's, as well as the commo nsense requirement that an artificial
means to be obligatory must be of
po tential usefulness. Thus:
Ordinary means are all medicines,
treatments, and operations, which of·
fer a reasonable hope o f benefit and
which can be obta ined and used without excessive expense, pain, or other
inconvenience.
Extraordinary means are all medicines, treatments, and o perations,
which cannot be obtained o r used
without excessive expense, pain , or
other inconvenience, or which. if
used . would not o ffer a reasonable
hope of benefit.62

Of course the physician cannot
be blamed for emphasizing the
purely medical considerations in
his a ppraisal of the appropriateness of the means for staving off
death. Necessarily this is the trend
of his training and competence, perhaps sometimes fortified by the potentiality of malpractice liability.
On a practical level the reco nciliation of the physicia n's and mo ralist's views o n extraordinuy means
is in the reality that, after a ll , the
dec isio n as to how ha rd and far lO
pus h to keep life going by artific ial
means, is ultimate ly the patie nt's.
no t the physician's. That is, the
physic ian may be legally obligated
to proffer what is c usto mary medical practice altho ug h the patient
may be morally e ntitle d to rejec t it
as extraordinary.63 Conversely, pres uma bly the patient is e ntitled to
have , in situatio ns whe re tha t is his
final hope because lesser e fforts
afford no promise. m e ans that the
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physician regards as medically unu- medical technique, just because e
sual or ex traordinary - although I has tried it out? Certainly not 'iO
sho uld like to qualify this a mo me nt where the patie nt declines furt' ~r
use; and when he is beyond per~ nlater fro m the moral viewpoint.
al
decision , because for exam le
While discussing physicians' parconsc
io us , c leara nce fron a
un
tic ipation in the life-death decisionor
family member seem. to
spouse
al process, it is pertinent to note
help
,
although
as previously nc ~d
an appare nt tendency among them
it
is
hard
to
find
a juridical b ·~is
to regard as more significant , and
for
letting
one
adult
dec ide vr
mo re hazardous, the sto pping o f
7 Estoppel might becon · a
another.6
extraordinary means compared to
failure to start the m in the first rele vant defense in a sui t for wn •lgplace.64 Thus, there is more hesi- ful d eath.
Can one wander throug h he
tan cy to turn off the resuscitato r
wards
of the aged dying, obseP •ng
th a n to decide originally not to turn
the
Elizabeth
Schell H9lt-Hartfo ds.
it o n . This distinction is I think
hearing
the
murmured
prayers · '-et
fro m the oral viewpoint , o nly a
me
pass
over,"
without
reali. ing
quibble. Indeed, might the re not
that
o
fte
n
the
frenetic
effort~
to
be mo re justification in ceasing
or
just
to
keep
g•
.ng
resuscitate
afte r a failing effort has been made.
the n in not trying in the first place? are a n affro nt to human digni ty In
The medical attitude in this reg~rd all truth the ir objective is no as
seems mo re psychologically than much the prolo ngation of life <~> of
ra tio nally based . Pe rhaps the phy- the process of dying. Can o ne d• ubt
sician has been excessively influ- that the Master Observer of the
e nced by the commo n law's historic human condition has percei ved the
distinction between "action" and moral as well as psychological re"inac tion." From the legal view- ality whe n in his King Lear he put it:
po int it is worth no ting tha t ProV ex not his ghost: 0, let him pa~,·
he hates him T hat would upon th.:
fessor Kamisar's careful research
rack o f this tough world Stretch hi111
fa iled to reveal by 1958 a single
o ut longer.66
case where there had been an indictment, let alone a convictio n, for Needless to say, I now put a.;ide
a " mercy-killing" by omission ;65 and the additio nal a nd relatively new
I know of none since. It seems problem, not wi thout moral implilegally far-fetched to convert "omis- cations o f its own, o f keeping a
sion·· into "commission" by the body pronounced dead functioning
me re fac t that the mac hine is turned in pa rt essentially as an organ bank
off when it fails to be effective , for transplantation purposes.69
Since the case for no t stretch ing
rather than not turned on in the
first place. 66 Civil liability of course out lo nger seems so self-evident,
is something else; but is there really how e xplain the countervailing mo·
much danger of malpractice be- tives and practices of so many phy·
cause a physician ceases to con- sicians and families? In the case of
tinue to use an apparently ho peless the forme r, is it sometimes sheer
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p~ofessional

pride, human ego, the
thrill of the game, perhaps akin to
the lawyer's will to win? As to the
families, maybe o ne typically need
look no further than to the traumatic shock of threatened death o f
a beloved. But is a sense of guilt
over past neglect, rathe r than love,
sometimes at least a partial explanation? In such an area one should not
speak abstractly; each threatened
death is unique and very personal.
Who, however much in agreement
with what I have just said, would
not applaud the most persistent and
heroic efforts imaginable to succG>r
the youthful victim of a casualty
such as an automobile accide nt?
Who would deny that in such a case
every intendment of the presumption of the will to live should be indulged by the physicians a nd all
concerned?
Perhaps these fre ne tic effo rts to
keep going the earthly life o f the
aged that nature wo uld forfeit go
hand in hand with the mate rialis m
of. mode rn society. The witty Hilatre Belloc observed:
Of old when men lay sic k and sorely
tried.
The doctors gave them physic and
they died.
But here's a happier age, fo r now we
know
Both how to make men sick and
keep them so!70

The willingness to let pass those
who are ready and wish to pass
seems as much an act of Christian
faith as of reco nciliatio n with nature's way. In this sense perhaps
there is as much of Christian hopefulness about death as of pagan
acceptance of dissolution in the
November, 1973

poet's invocat.ion o f the concept o l
conquering "the fever called 'Living.' "71
That it is permissible to withhold
extraordinary means to me seems
so clear tha t future discussion is
like ly to focus instead on whether
and unde r what circ umstances
there is a duty to do so. Recall
the e nding of the quoted allocution o f Pius XII: "One is not forbidde n to take more than the
strictly necessary steps to preserve
life and health , as long as he does
no t fail in some more serious
duty."72 Doubtless that is the starting point o f the relevant analysis
and doubtless, too, the decision
typically is for the patient, not the
physician. But what are the more
serio us duties that should preponderate fo r example in the mind of
the head of the family , over extravagant efforts to preserve his
own life? That profligate expense
may deprive the children of educatio n, certainly seems relevant. Hardly less so is the mental torture that
may be imposed on the family by
indefinite prolongation o f the physical dissolution of its head. And
possibly, if medical facilities and
services increasingly become o f
lesser availability in relation to the
demand, society's needs may some
day be held to supersede the personal requests fo r extrao rdinary
means even by those financially
able to pay.
No sooner as one has thus spo ke n
of the right, even possibly the duty,
of ~ithholding extraordinary means
than he wonders if his message
te nds to undermine the medical
pro fessional's proudest boast and
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happiest claim - its historic bulldogged defe nse of human life. For
in result , even when no t in motivation , there is more than professional
pride and human ego in the physician's strugglings. As Gerald K elley,
S.J. put it: " By working on even the
smallest hope doctors often produce wonderful results , whereas a
defeatist attitude would in a certain
se nse 'turn back the clock' o f medical progress. Also, this professional
ideal is a sure preventive o f an
e utha nasian mentality."73
Our last, and hardest question ,
essentially becomes: Is the distinction between letting die, and
killing, sound eno ugh to preclude
the euthanasian mentality?
The Distinction between Killing,
and Letting Die, Continues to be
Viable, Valid and Meaningful
If it is permissible to let die a
patient direly afflicted and sorely
suffering, why is it wrong affirmatively to help him die with loving
purpose and kindly means? The
question poses stark c hallenge to
philosopher, theologian, ethician ,
moralist, physician, lawyer and all
persons of good will whether or not
re ligio usly oriented.
Le t us put onto the scales our
conclusions to the moment, on the
one side the permissible things, on
the o the r those forbidden. Note that
on each side there is a negative and
an affirmative thing. It is permissible to withhold ex traord inary
means, a nd also to g ive drugs to
relieve pai n even to the point o f
causing death. It is no t permissible
to withhold ordinary means, or
affirmatively and inte ntiona lly to
cause death.
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All o f us, specifically Ia'\ ·rs,
are under injunction to avoi( .he
hypocrisy that inflicts on ma1 tnd
unnecessary burdens. One . ca not
daily face in law school cl ses
the yout h of the country wit )Ut
perceiving that whateve r may 1ve
happened to parts of the Decal! ue,
hypocrisy remains a n acknowle · ~ed
and detested sin. Will o ur d i ~ nctions withstand indictment ~l' deception or sham? Can we 1 -;ist
upon them without being L pocrites?
Certainly the fact that ou1 listinctions a re fine does no of
itself condemn them, ·Biology. lsycho logy and morality, like life
itself, are filled with close ( testions, narrow definitions, and ine
distinctions.74 T he margin between pain and pleasure rna be
as imprecise as that between ve
and hate.75 Nor is uni versal ·ertainty and equality of applic< ion
of principle to the facts of ( 1ses
necessarily a test of the princil'le's
validity. Appellate judges are
wont to say that much must be left
to the d iscretion of trial j u c~es,
and moralists must concur that
much must be left to the judgment
of those who apply principle to
hard facts. As Gerald Vann , O.P.
put it:
Moral action presupposes scient '
but is itself an an, the an of livin!'·
Moral science concerns itself fir't
o f all with general princ iples, as in·
deed being a science it must ; but the
s ubjec t of morality is not human action in general, but this or that human
ac tion, in this or that set of circumstances, and emanating from this or
that personality. Hence the fact.
remarked upon by A ristotle, that
ethics cannot be an e xact science.
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There is no set of ready·made rules
to be applied to eachindividual case ;
the principles have to be applied , but
this is the function of the virtue of
prudence, and with prudence as with
an, as Maritain points out , each new
case is really a new and unique case,
each action is a unique action. What
constitutes the goodness of an action
is the relation of the mind not to
moral principles in the abstract but
to this individual moral action. Hence
an essential element of quasi-intuition
is at least implicit in every willed a nd
chosen action .76

Incidentally , we common law
lawyers have admirable instrum ents
by which to effectuate the moralist's ac knowledgme nt of the necessity of accommodation o f principle to fact. We have at the intellectual o r formal level the institutions of Equity and on the pragmatic
level trial by jury. True, the accommodation by a jury may be radical
indeed, as Dryden observed centuries ago:
Who laughs but once to see an ass
Mumbling to make the co ursegrained thistles pass,
Would laugh again to see a jury chaw
The thistles o f an unpalatable law.77

My only point in passing is that with
such means of accommodatio n, I
doubt that we need formal provisions of law to mitigate the potential harshness in applying homicide
principles to me rcy deaths. Whether or not we do, is certainly a legitimate and open question ; some will
argue for statutes authorizing lesser
penalties in case of euthanasia, as
in Norway.78 Personally. I fear that
formal provision fo r mitigation
might do mo re harm educationally
by way of undermining the distinction between letting die and killing,
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than good substantively.79 This o f
course presupposes the validity of
the distinction, to which we now
turn .
Daniel Maq uire in Commonweal
recently concluded: " It can be said
that in certain cases, direct positive
inte rvention to bring on death may
be morally permissible ... The absolutist stance opposed to this conclusion must assume the burden of
proof - an impossible burden , I
believe."80 This conclusion on
burde n of proof will I think astou nd
the proceduralist, ce rtainly o ne of
historical orientation , as much as
the moralist. For centuries medical
e thics has drawn sharp and firm
distinction between "positive action" and "calculated benign neglect," to use Maquire's own terms.81
T he theologian's principle of double e ffect is an ancie nt one. In the
face of the historical realities, why,
suddenly, this reversal o f the burden of proof? Hardly because today's logic is sharper; the principle
of double effect has been reexamined and criticized by a ble minds
for generatio ns. Do the new psychological insights justify such reversal of the field? Quite the contrary, I submit.
The principle of double effect has
four criteria. Let us apply them to
the distinction perhaps the hardest
of all to sustain, that between the
administration of drugs to kill, on
the one ha nd , and the administration to relieve pain even though
death may be hastened, on the
other. The crite ria are:
(i) the act itself must be morally
good, or at least neutral;
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(ii) the purpose must be to achieve
the good consequence, the bad consequence be ing o nly a side effec t :
(iii) the good effect must not be
achieved by way of the bad, but both
must result fro m the same act ;
(iv) the bad result must not be so
serious as to outweigh the advantage
o f the good result.82

Admittedly application of these
c riteria may produce nuances so
delicate that the decision of o ne
able and conscientious mind may
be at odds with another equally
able and conscientious. Conceding arguendo that a principle of
suc h ambivalent potential may have
logical deficiencies, is not the ultimate question of its justification
not o ne of dry logic but o f its psychological validity? Let us suppose
a physician, faced with his patie nt's
into lerable pain unmitigable by ~es
ser doses and his urgent plea fo r
relief, decides on a dose of analgesic likely to cause death. (You may
substitute "certainly to cause death"
if you wish, but I would remind that
in the physiological realities, it
may always remain doubtful whether the pain itself might have been
as death-producing.)
Contrast the attitude and manner
whic h the motive of relieving pain
engenders, with those likely consequent upon a grim determinatio n
to kill. If the purpose explicitly
were to kill , would there not be
profound difference in the very way
o ne would grasp the syringe, the
look in the e ye, the words that
might be spoken or withheld , those
subtle admixtures of fear and ho pe
that haunt the death-bed scene?
And would not the consequences
o f the difference be compounded
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almost geometrically at least ~or
the physician as he killed one ' ch
patient after another? And wh< of
the repercussions of the diffe n .ce
on the nurses and hospital · a .!ndants?83 Ho w long would the < ality and attitude o f me rcy sut ve
death-intending cond uct? The ne
between the civilized and sa\. .ge
in men is fine enough witr Jut
jeopardizing it by euthanasia. listory teaches the line is main r 1n·
able under the principle of dot 1le
effect ; it might well not be undt · a
regime of direct intentional kill 1g.
Mo reover, I fear the effect~ on
the family if law, sometime s he
great teacher of o ur soc iety, \1. re
to start to teach the legitimac~ of
direct killing. I am indebted to
my colleague David Daube f,, a
telling illustration of the vali· ··ry
o f this concern. There was at )xford o ne of the great historian!' of
the century who was to tally p<ralyzed up to the shoulde rs, with all
that implies by way of dependence
and suffering. A loving wife a nd
family nurtured and sustained him,
at no mean cost, of course. The
visits of this profound scholar and
scintilating conversationalist to All
Souls College were a weekly delight to all who could sha re the cnffee hour with him , even as he sipped
with a tube fro m the cup. Immobile
in his wheel chair, he nevertheless
gave a final memorable lecture.
Under a regime of euthanasia's le).!itimacy, wo uld not cultivated, sensitive, and selfless spirits such as this
feel an obligation to s pare their
families the burden? Certainly in
this case, as Professor Da ube concludes, scholarship, family life and
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All Souls C ollege might have paid
a heavy price in an euthanasiac
regime for an act that might have
been coerced by a sense o f obligation.84 To the sensitive and selfless especially, what the law would
permit migh t well become the measure of obligation to family and
friends.ss
There is no time to wend ou r
way back to the great natural law
philosophers suc h as Heracli tus and
Cicero. In any event I claim no
special ·competence to lead the
trek, as has recently my colleague
Ehrenzweig in his usua lly profound
and comprehensive way, albeit in
uncqnventional context.86 I canno t
help wonder, though •. whether the
principal mischief with suc h lifeinterfering proposals as euthanasia
is their undue deprecation of the
importance of the natural order
in human affairs. As a principal
heresy of the 19th Century was that
progress lay in human domination
of the environment, perha ps the
heresy of this century will prove
to be that biological evolution must
be dominated by human will.B7 Certainly we must hope that the freedom and integrity of the human
person will not be as much ravaged
and stripped as have been the forests and fields and waters of the
world. As a physician puts it:
We are possessed with a technologic
spirit in which power over nature is
the predominant theme. We ignore
the fa ct that there is an intrinsic despair and disparity in looking to technology for a solution. We forget that
our problem is not to master nature,
but to nurture nature. We also forget
that technological achievements are,
at best, ameliorative, and, at wo rst,
dehumanizing.sa
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The additional dilemmas that
a regime of mercy deaths would
impose - such problems as ascertainment of true and abiding consent - would seem of themselves
reasons for avoiding the creation
of more unlighted paths.89 Is not
the preferred choice continuing
progress in the alleviation of pain
and loving care of the Elizabeth
Schell Holt-Hartfords among our
neighbors, rather than killing? We
are only mortal, and in this area a
gra nd attempt to restructure the
nat ural o rder seems more dangero us than ho peful. Nature can be
harsh and c ruel, but it is never
corrupt. Human will can be all
three.
Perhaps afte r all I have discovered rapport with at least o ne song
the you ng folks sing, ·'Que sera,
sera ." T here are some thi ngs tha t
would be tha t we'd better let be .
Conclusion
The distinction between affirmative killing, and allowing o ne to
d ie according to nature's order without extraordinary effort to "stretch
him out longer," conti nues to be
a valid, viable and meaningful distinction.oo T he line of demarca tio n
may be fine , but so are many other
lines that men must draw in their
fallible perception and limi ted wisdom. Application of the principled
d istinctio n between ordinary and
extraordinary means of pro longing
life occasions difficulties, but hardly any different in quality fro m vario us othe r decisions in applying a
general principle to particular
facts. The distinction between the
use of drugs to kill, and their use
to alleviate pain even though death
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may thereby be hastened, is like- script form hy the Joseph P . Kenn
Foundation . Washington. D.C.
wise valid.
J. Kamisar. ··some Non-Religious
I.! WS
When the question becomes one Against Proposed Mercy-Killing l slafor the legal system, fortunately tion:· 42 Minn. L. R ev. 969, 1016.. ~8).
our law has time-tested devices for
4. Your Death Warrant? (Gould an< ·a igaccommodating principle and facts, myle. e d s. 197 1). This book, frequenth ted,
notably the jury. It seems hardly is the product of a Study Group on ·thathonasia set up as a joint venture by the
necessary or wise for us to attempt lie Union of Great Britain and the G I of
articulation of formal legal stan- C atholic Doctors. The members of the Hl p
dards of lesser liability in cases of were C icely C larke, Lo rd C raigmyle , ( rles
euthanasia than for other criminal Dent. J . G. Frost, J . E. MeA. G lanc\ .10,
.:ph
homicides in the manner of Nor- Jonatha n Gould. F. J . H e rbe rt,
G.
Molony, QC, G. E. Mo riarty, R.
wegian law. The harm of the edu- O'Bri e n. F. F. M . Pole, Hugh Rossi, Ml '. s.
cative effects of formalization of Tweedy and Will iam T. Wells, QC (! relesser penalties for euthanasia, after the book will be c ited simply as ·ath
probably would outweigh the values Warrant.
5. Death Warrant, 21.
thereby gained by way of certainty
6. Death Warrant, 22; N. St. John-' vas,
of legal consequence and surer Ltfe. Death and The Law, 270, ( 1961
guarantee of equal protection of
7. Death Warrant, 23-26.
the law.
8. The sick room under a e utha ~ iac
Our era is one that seeks, and regime has been likened to the goulish mgoften for good reason, a constant ing scene, in which the executione r wo t. go
to the condemned's cell, ascertain h is " g ht,
expansion of a juridical orde r in h is stature, the sturdiness of his ned e tc.
huma n affairs. But not every human A ll o f this ensued upon the judge's d< 1i ng
relatio nship stands to profit from a black mask behind which he prono. ced
complete juridicalization, as witness sentence.
9. Chapter VIII , (1957). See also W ll tms,
pare nt-child relations. Besides the · "Mercy
Killing Legislatio n - a Rejoit 'e r."
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Thus doctor and pa tie nt we re under e utha nasiac commitme nt · during a pproximate ly the last 11 years of Fre ud's life.
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ing the subjection o f an adult Jel Jh's
87. Louisell, note 69 supra. During my Witness. who had sustained severe i 1ries
recent visit at the University of Minnesota, in an automobile accident, to
lood
Mark Wraubard, professor o f the history of tra nsfu sio n necessary to save her h
the
science (now emeri tus), indicated a possible Court pe r Weintraub, Ch. J. said: "II ems
incurs io n into the areas suggested in this correct to say there is no constitt onal
parag ra ph o f the text. I hope it is forth· right to choose to die.'' Replying
the
coming!
patient's contention that there is a diff, ·nee
88. H . Ratner, M.D., Editorial, 7 Child and be tween passively submiuing to de<J t and
Family 99 (1968).
actively seeking it , the Court sai• "If
89. While I have often thought that pe r· the State may interrupt one mode <• self·
missive abortion is more morally re prehen· destructio n (suicide) it may wi th eq u au·
sible than voluntary euthan asia for the aged
tho ri ty interfere with the o ther." It ad <)WI·
in that the former c uts off life be fore it has edges th at "It is arguably different hen
had its chance, it must be conceded that a n individual , overtake n by illness, d tdes
the· self-centered fears and anx ieties a n to let it run a fatal course." Pretern • ting
e utha nasiac regime might e ngender among the question of the free exerc ise of re ton,
the e lderly (or those in the process of be· it seems unfo rtunate that the Court · par·
coming elderly - as we a ll are) have no ently did not confront more direct!· the
exact counterpart in the case of abortion. extent o f the obligation to use art• ·.:ial
90. T here is disturbing la nguage in J. F. means to s ustain life.
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A model no-fault divorce statute
has been developed by the National
Confe rence of Comm issio ners o n
Un iform State Laws. The model
statute was referred by the American Ba r Association to its Family
Law Section in 1971. After careful
study, the Family Law Section recomme nded that the ABA withho ld
During the past three to five endorsement of the model law pe ndyears, there has been a continual ing more extensive study, and as o f
effort to revise and update the mar- the February, 1972, meeting of the
riage laws thro ughout the Un ited ABA , no e ndo rseme nt was give n.
States. In too many cases this has
No-fault divorce is looked upo n
become simply an effo rt to replace
as a radical d e parture fro m the
current divorce laws with the sopast system. There are no grounds
called no-fault statute, a nd in many
for d ivorce o the r than the irreother sta tes, the more importa nt
trievable breakdown of the maraspects of do mestic relati ons law
receive less atte ntion beca use of riage. T here is no necessity to d etermine who is g uilty fo r the brea kthe debate about no-fault divorce.
down of the marriage. but simply
No-fault divorce laws will receive
increasing public atte ntio n for the the necessity to verify that it has
irre trievably broken down. Most
next few years, principally because
ofte n, th is is ascertained from the
some type of no-fa ult legislation
affirmatio n by the couple.
has been introduced in several
T he basic diffic ulties o f the breakStates and has already been adopted
down theory are:
in some. Thus it is worth considering this specific legal proposal and
I. Establishing objective criteria
the anticipated effec ts it will have that can be applied to indicate the
in terms of marriage counseling breakdown of marriage.
and the physician's ro le.
2. Establishing some manageable
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